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Diana T Fritz 03/20/2007 03:45:46 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable
Text:

UNCLASSIFIED

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM

November 29, 2003

To: No Action Addressee
Action: Unknown
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 5095 - UNKNOWN)
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, ASEC
Captions: None
Subject: UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
Ref: None

UNCLAS ABU DHABI 05095

SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: POL
INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: P/M:SY; RSO:JR; ECON:OJ LEGATT:BM; CG:JD

VZCZCADI120
OO RUEHC RUEHZM
DE RUEHAD #5095/01 3331222
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291222Z NOV 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2513
INFO RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 005095

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT EAP, INR/AN/NESA, DS/DSS/ATA, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [ASEC](#) [TC](#)
SUBJECT: UAE: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 301352

1. The following information is keyed to reftel section two. (A separate complementary classified cable will follow with additional information.)

A) In 2003 the UAE continued to provide outstanding assistance and cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism. The UAE played a critical role in assisting the continuing investigation into the 9/11 attacks. The UAE Central Bank continued to aggressively enforce UAE anti-money laundering regulations pursuant to the 2002 comprehensive law criminalizing money laundering, including terrorist money laundering. Together with tightened oversight and reporting requirements for the domestic financial markets, there is now a stronger legal and regulatory framework to deter abuse of UAE financial markets. Cooperation across the board -- from the financial realm through to security

and intelligence -- has been strong and sustained. The Central Bank has provided training programs to banks and financial institutions on money laundering and terrorist financing, investigated financial transactions, and frozen accounts in response to relevant UN resolutions and internal investigations. Although we do not have a breakout of information for 2003 specifically, the UAE Central Bank has provided the following information on its efforts to combat money laundering over the last two years. Between August 2001 and May 2003, the Anti Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the Central Bank analyzed 429 suspicious transactions reports received from banks and other financial institutions. In approximately 11 percent of the cases, the Central Bank froze the assets and referred the cases to the public prosecutor's office. The AMLSCU has also responded to requests for information on about 164 cases from other Financial Intelligence Units. As a result of these requests, the AMLSCU investigated and froze 23 accounts. In addition, the UAE has frozen 18 accounts totaling more than \$3 million in response to UNSC anti-terrorist financing resolutions. The Central Bank has also conducted 58 workshops on money laundering and terrorist financing for banks and other financial institutions. In September 2003, Dubai police and UAE armed forces cooperated at the annual IMF/World Bank meeting to successfully prevent terrorist incidents.

B) The UAE judicial system did not conduct any trials related to terrorist acts in 2003. There were no acts of terrorism against or affecting U.S. citizens or facilities in the UAE during 2003.

C) The Embassy did consult on matters of mutual interest with the UAEG regarding extradition during 2003. The Embassy did not make any official requests to extradite terrorist suspects wanted by the U.S.

D) The lack of a formal extradition treaty between the U.S. and UAE is the major impediment to the host government's extradition of suspected terrorists. We are actively engaged in negotiations with UAEG on a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The UAE has demonstrated repeatedly that it will not allow the absence of an extradition treaty or an MLAT to impede cooperation with friendly countries, including the United States, in the international effort to bring terrorists to justice.

E) The UAE government has spoken out repeatedly and consistently, both publicly and privately, against acts of terrorism. In August 2003, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan publicly criticized a suicide attack against the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad. Also, in August, the Foreign Ministry denounced the terrorist attack at the Mosque of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib in Najaf. In November 2003, UAE President Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan publicly condemned as "criminal and cowardly attacks" a suicide car bombing believed carried out by Al Qaida against Arab expatriates and Saudis in a Riyadh residential compound. The UAE Cabinet issued its own denunciation, calling the attack a "heinous crime" and supporting any actions the Saudi government may take to put an end to terrorism. The UAE has provided outstanding assistance with a number of ongoing terrorist investigations.

F) The UAE has a framework for cooperation on terrorist financing issues pursuant to a comprehensive anti-money-laundering law passed in 2002. In addition to promptly freezing the accounts of terrorist entities designated under the relevant U.N. procedures, the UAE has received anti-terrorist training from the State Department's ATA program, in addition to anti-money-laundering training and technical assistance from the USG for bankers, prosecutors, judges, and police.

G) The UAE extended no support for international terrorism, terrorists, or terror groups in 2003.

H) The UAE made no public statements in support of a terrorist-supporting country on a terrorism issue in 2003.

I) The UAE's strong opposition to terrorism continued unabated in 2003. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the global war on terrorism improved this year, largely owing to a broadening and deepening of counter-terrorism relationships.

ALBRIGHT